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ANTI-TAKEOVER ACTIONS AND DEFENSES:
BUSINESS JUDGMENT OR BREACH OF DUTY?
HENRY

F.

JOHNSON t

I. INTRODUCTION

RECENTLY,

the Landmark Banking Corporation of Florida
mailed to its shareholders a proxy solicitation which contained
an elaborate combination of measures aimed at warding off unfriendly takeover bids." Specifically, Landmark asked its shareholders to approve amendments to its articles of incorporation
which would provide for staggered three year terms for directors,
eliminate shareholder ability to remove directors except for cause,
and prohibit shareholders from voting their shares except at a meeting for which prior notice had been given. In addition, these
amendments would require an eighty percent majority of the board
of directors or a two-thirds majority of the outstanding voting
shares to approve bylaw changes. Finally, any merger or business
combination would have to be approved by a ninety-five percent
majority of the voting shares outstanding, including a majority of
the shares not held by the acquiring concern or any five percent
2
shareholder.
These measures and others of a similar nature 3 clearly discriminate between large and small shareholders and provide int Associate Professor of Law, Saint Mary's University School of Law. B.A.,
University of Florida, 1965; J.D., University of Miami, 1977; LL.M., New York
University, 1978.
1. Wall St. J., May 13, 1982, at 28, col. 3 (s.w. ed.).
2. Id. At the time of the proxy solicitation, officers and directors of
Landmark Banking owned 11% of the firm's outstanding shares. Landmark's
own trust department was the largest single shareholder, owning 6.7% of the
outstanding shares. At the same time, however, the bank was contractually
obligated to sell some $50 million of convertible preferred stock to three individual investors who would thereafter control 28.6% of the stock. Upon consummation of this sale, the three individuals would effectively control the
company, since they would have the ability to veto any and all fundamental
corporate changes. Id.
3. Examples of other defensive tactics include the issuance of noninterest
bearing loans to officers and directors, selling off attractive lines of business,
and initiating lucrative separation agreements for officers in the event of a
takeover. See Cohen, Takeover Bids: How Target Companies Fight Back,
26 FIN. ANALYSTS 1. 26 (1970); Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Rtght to Resist Tender Offers, 61 Cm. B. REC. 152 (1979);
Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. RE.

L. Rav. 882 (1978); Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1982, at 10, col. 1; Wall St. J., Mar. 31,
1982, at 14, col. 2; Barron's, Apr. 28, 1980, at 33, col. 2.

(51)
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cumbent management with an effective veto power over most
corporate transactions. Such changes in the corporate documents
tend not only to perpetuate control of the corporation by the
incumbent board and management, but they also tend to discourage
tender offers which may in fact be in the best interests of the shareholders. Yet, since shareholders apparently have little or no interest
in anything except the stock price and dividends,4 anti-takeover
measures such as those proposed by the Landmark Banking Corporation usually receive little opposition. In any event, there is little
that can be done about such practices, if full disclosure has been
given5 and if the "business judgment rule" 6 applies.
In general, the stock market constitutes a major control upon
corporate management. When the incumbent managers of a
publicly-held concern do not do their jobs well, the company's
shares will eventually decline in price reflecting the company's
diminished prospects. Occasionally, when the shares reach that
point where the corporation's assets are worth more than the total
selling price of all the outstanding shares, the company becomes a
4. See Borden & Weiner, An Investment Decision Analysis of Cash Tender
Offer Disclosure, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 553, 575-76 (1978) ("In the real world
. * * price is in fact the name of the game."); Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of
Cash Takeover Bids, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1967, at 135, 142 ("[W]hile
the tender offer is vitally interwoven with considerations of power, job security,
and other perquisites of office, for the average shareholder it is confined to the
choice between holding or selling one stock.").
5. The Securities Act of 1933 requires registration and full disclosure for
all nonexempt distributions of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-(aa) (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980). In addition, the proxy rules of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
require disclosure whenever proxies are solicited and in certain other instances.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)-(kk) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980). The theory behind these statutes is that an investor who is apprised
of all pertinent facts will be able to make logical, informed decisions regarding
the purchase and sale of securities and in voting his shares. In addition, the
availability of information helps ensure that the market price of a security
more nearly corresponds to its actual value. See Hewitt, Developing Concepts
of Materiality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAW. 887, 891 (1977); Schoenbaum, The
Relationship Between Corporate Disclosure and Corporate Responsibility, 40
FORDIIAM

L.

REV.

565, 575 (1972).

6. Briefly stated, the business judgment rule was founded upon the notion
that the shareholders had chosen directors to run the corporation, and therefore
their management decisions, if made in good faith, should not result in liability. In other words, courts traditionally disallow shareholder challenges to
decisions made by the board of directors if the board has acted in good faith.
United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64
(1917). Generally, directors are only liable for their business decisions if they
have acted negligently or in bad faith. See Miller v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251,
1255-56 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Selheimer v. Manganese Corp., 423 Pa. 563, 581,
224 A.2d 634, 644 (1966).
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tempting target for a takeover.7

With the recent economic slump

fostering a declining stock market, this has occurred often over the
8
past few years.
In response to fears of takeover attempts, the management of
potential target companies have resorted to what might be termed
"anti-takeover devices." 9 While some of these tactics are subject
to the federal securities laws, others are outside the reach of the
securities statutes so long as management provides full disclosure
to the investors.10 In such instances, courts analyze the propriety
of these tactics against the common law fiduciary duty owed a
corporation and its shareholders by directors as such duty exists
against the backdrop of the business judgment rule. This article
will discuss both business judgment and fiduciary duty concepts as
they should apply to some of the more prevalent anti-takeover
devices. It will also show how corporate management in some
instances clearly breaches its fiduciary responsibilities to the company and its shareholders by proposing to adopt anti-takeover devices that place management in positions of power, perpetuity, and
potential reward."
7. A simple example follows. Suppose a company's stock is selling for $10
a share while its assets per share (book value) are approximately $20. If an
acquiring company offers $15 per share, it can give the target company's shareholders a 50% premium over the market price while acquiring assets for 75%
of their book value. In such an instance all parties (except, perhaps, the
target company's management) benefit: the shareholders receive a higherthan-market price, and the acquirer picks up assets cheaply.
8. Bleiberg, One Shareholder, One Vote?, Barron's, Aug. 24, 1981, at 7,
cols. 1 & 8, col. 5.
9. One such device has been to move the corporate offices to a state with
stringent state takeover statutes, but this method was rendered less attractive
recently when the Supreme Court struck down a stringent Illinois takeover
statute on the ground that it conflicted with federal tender offer legislation.
See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982). In particular, the Mite Corp.
decision held that the Illinois statute frustrated the Congressional purpose of
the Williams Act by introducing extended delay into the tender offer process
and by allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to pass on the substantive fairness of a tender offer, an approach in conflict with that adopted by Congress.
Id. at 2638-40. The Williams Act amended § 13 and § 14 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to deal specifically with tender offers and takeovers.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (Supp. IV 1980).
10. For a discussion of the full disclosure requirements of the Securities
Acts, see note 5 and accompanying text supra.
11. At this point it should be noted that this article will not discuss the
Williams Act in any detail. The Williams Act has been the subject of numerous scholarly publications. See, e.g., Johnson, Disclosure in Tender Offer
Transactions: The Dice Are Still Loaded, 42 U. PiTT. L. REv. 1 (1980); Wilner
& Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1976); Note, The Courts and the Williams Act:
Try A Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1973).
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II. ANTI-TAKEOVER DEVICES, MANAGEMENT WELFARE, AND
BUSINESS JUDGMENT

Over the years, corporate managements and their legal counsel
have developed various defensive tactics to deal with the prospect
of a takeover. By and large, this package of defenses has concentrated primarily on beating the offeror once the offer has been put
forward. 12

In so doing, management attempts to raise a barrier to
takeover 1 and thus preserve its own position and concomitant

the
economic advantages. 14 Such actions often result in the withdrawal
of the tender offer, 15 with a corresponding loss to those shareholders
who desired to take advantage of the offer. 16
12. See Steinbrink, supra note 3, at 903. The package of defenses usually
includes: 1) detailed plans that can be executed on a moment's notice; 2) training and orientation programs for management; and 3) changes in the corporate
charter and bylaws that would frustrate a takeover attempt. Id. at 903-04.
See also Black & Smith, Antitakeover Charter Provisions: Defending Self Help
for Takeover Targets, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 699 (1979); Fleisher, Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 9 REV. SEC. REG. 853 (1976); Hochman & Folger,
Deflecting Takeovers: Charter & By-Law Techniques, 34 Bus. LAW. 537 (1979);
Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers,
64 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1979); Comment, Review of Literature on Defensive
Tactics to Surprise Cash Tender Offers, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 909 (1980);

Comment, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1028 (1982).

13. The "barrier" can include the institution of an antitrust suit against
the offeror, the solicitation of alternative bids from a "white knight", the
selling off of attractive lines of business or subsidiary companies, or the issuance of additional equity. See generally Brown, Changes in Offeror Strategy
in Response to New Laws and Regulations, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 843
(1978); Weiss, Tender Offers and Management Responsibility, 23 N.Y.L. ScH.
L. REV. 445 (1978).

14. A former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission has
stated that "[i]t would be naive to assume that tender offers are not, at times,
opposed by managements motivated by their own interests in staving off a
change in control." Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S.510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities
of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1967)
(statement of Chairman Manuel F. Cohen).
15. See generally Flom, Forcing a Friendly Offer, 32 Bus. LAW. 1319
(1977); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 296 F. Supp.
462 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
16. When management succeeds in discouraging the tender offer, it is
often the shareholder who takes the brunt of the blow. For example, when
Carter Hawley Hale Stores offered $42 per share for Marshall Field & Co.,
Field's management objected to the offer as being "inadequate." Bleiberg,
What Price Stewardship?, Barron's, Feb. 15, 1982 at 9, col. 1, & 11, col. 1.
When Marshall Field was later acquired by Batus, Inc. (the American retailing
arm of British American Tobacco which owns Saks Fifth Avenue), the price
was a mere $30 per share. Wall St. J., Mar. 29, 1982, at 8, col. I. With 10.8
million shares involved, stockholders of Marshall Field wound up with $130
million less than they would have received in the earlier transaction. See
also Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. II1. 1980), aff'd,
646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). For a further
discussion of Panter,see text accompanying notes 28-51 supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss1/2

4

Johnson: Anti-Takeover Actions and Defenses: Business Judgment or Breach o
1982-83]

ANTI-TAKEOVER ACTIONS AND DEFENSES

It has been argued that corporations have a right to remain
independent and therefore corporate officers may pursue that objective by resisting tender offers by any available device. 17 Conversely, some commentators have asserted that any and all attempts
by a target's management to discourage takeovers should be prohibited."" The former position asserts that management's antitakeover actions should be "sheltered" from judicial scrutiny by
application of the "business judgment rule," while the latter position argues for the inapplicability of that rule in a tender offer
situation.
The fundamental premise of the business judgment rule is that
corporate managers, by virtue of their role as stewards of the company, are more knowledgeable about the values and directions of
the enterprise than are outsiders. Consequently, these managers
Although there are a few instances where investors came out ahead after
the termination of a tender offer, even in those cases shareholders owning
stock in the target company at the time of the original offer were forced either
to sell in the open market or to hold their securities for an extended period
while waiting for a higher price. See The (Happily) Reluctant Brides, FORBES,
Mar. 17, 1980, at 126.
17. See Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW.
101 (1979); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom; An Update
After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017 (1981). Mr. Lipton justifies the right of
corporations to remain independent on a number of grounds. Relying on a
survey of rejected tender offers, he first asserts that shareholders usually benefit
financially in the long run when a takeover is rejected. Lipton, Takeover
Bids in the Target's Boardroom, supra, at 106-09. He also maintains that
management has a duty to further interests besides those of shareholders such
as the interests of employees, the public, the community, and the country as
a whole. Id. at 106. Mr. Lipton similarly argues that national policy requires
long-term planning and that management is the most capable of providing
this planning. Id. at 115-16. Finally, Mr. Lipton asserts that the business
judgment rule should apply to the rejection of tender offers, because tender
offers are similar to any other business decision of the directors. Id. at 120.
18. See Easterbrook ge Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981). Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel propose a rule of managerial passivity in the tender
offer situation. Id. at 1199-1204. They first point out that shareholders are
deprived of the tender premium as well as possible synergistic gains and tax
advantages when a tender offer is defeated. Id. at 1164-69. They further
support their view on the ground that tender offers are one of the few effective
methods of monitoring management since shareholders themselves are generally too passive to be effective monitors. Id. at 1171-73. Additionally, Professors Easterbrook and Fischel emphasize management's interest in preserving
their positions and salaries when confronted with a takeover bid. Id. at 1175.
Finally, they assert that the business judgment rule is inapplicable to the
tender offer situation, because that rule only applies to questions of duty and
not to questions of loyalty. Id. at 1194-99. For further works expressing
similar views, see Easterbrook 8c Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics &
Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1981); Gilson, A Structural Approach
to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33
STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 12; Comment, The
Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, supra note 12.
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are best able to make business decisions that maximize the shareholder's welfare.' 9 The principle involved is majority rule, in that
a majority of directors should have the right to determine the business policy of the corporation, free from judicial intervention, so
20
long as they act in good faith and do not breach their trust.
Essentially, the business judgment rule was designed to apply to
contracts or other transactions between the corporation and outsiders, where the corporation's management is usually free from
conflicting interests and can be depended upon to act for the corporation's benefit.21

Even so, most recent decisions dealing with anti-

takeover actions have applied the business judgment rule to uphold
management's action, often disregarding the welfare of the share22
holders.
In Johnson v. Trueblood,2 3 for instance, minority shareholders
alleged that the corporate directors were acting under a desire to
remain in control when the directors proposed a sale of new shares
to one of the majority owners.2 4 The plaintiffs in Trueblood
claimed that this desire, by itself, was sufficient to shift the burden
of proof to the defendants, 25 thus precluding application of the
19. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S.
261, 263-64 (1917) ("Courts interfere seldom to control such discretion intra
vires the corporation ....
"); Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d
759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974) ("The sound business judgment rule . . . expresses the
unanimous decision of American courts to eschew intervention in corporate
decision-making ....
"); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del.
1981) ("The 'business judgment' rule evolved to give recognition and deference
to directors' business expertise when exercising their managerial power .... ");
Selheimer v. Manganese Corp., 423 Pa. 563, 581, 224 A.2d 634, 644 (1966)
("Courts are reluctant to interfere in the internal management of a corporation, since that is a matter for the discretion and judgment of the directors
and shareholders ....
"). See generally 2 R. MAGNUSON, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION § 15 (1981).
20. 2 R. MAGNUSON, supra note 19, at § 15.01. See, e.g., Regenstein v.
J. Regenstein Co., 213 Ga. 157, 159, 97 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1957) ("No principle
of law is more firmly fixed in our jurisprudence than the one which declares
that the courts will not interfere in matters involving merely the judgment of
the majority in exercising control over corporate affairs."); Neidert v. Neidert,
637 S.W.2d 296, 301 (Mo. App. 1982) (where the matter under consideration
calls for business judgment of a majority of shareholders or of a board of
directors, courts will not interfere if this judgment is exercised fairly and
honestly).
21. F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-OUTS" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS: ExPULSION
OR REPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES 171 (1975).
22. Easterbrook 8: Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, supra note 18, at 1163. See Treadway Cos. v.
Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454
F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
23. 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
24. Id. at 289 & n.3. It should be noted that the corporation in question
was a "close" corporation. See note 27 infra.

25. 629 F.2d at 292-93.
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business judgment rule. The Third Circuit rejected both contentions, stating that while the desire to remain in control, standing
alone, is an improper motive for the decisions of a director, a
director may properly decline to adopt a course of action which
would result in a shift of control so long as his actions can be
attributed to any rational business purpose. 2 Therefore, application of the business judgment rule is not precluded simply by
showing that a director's decision was influenced by his desire to
remain in office, unless this desire was the "sole or primary purpose"
27
for the decision.
Recently, the Seventh Circuit, using the Third Circuit's
opinion in Trueblood as precedent, rejected a shareholder challenge to management's anti-takeover actions in the case of Panter
v. Marshall Field & Co. 2 8 In Panter, shareholders brought a class
action against Marshall Field 8c Co., alleging that Field and its
26. Id. at 292-93.
27. Id. Even though Trueblood involved a close corporation, the court
did not limit the predominance standard to corporations of that type. The
court indicated that the standard actually applies to all corporations by referring to several earlier cases involving publicly held corporations. Id. at
293. The cases cited by the court include Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347
A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975) ("[I]t is unquestionably Delaware law that the
use of corporate funds to purchase corporate shares primarily to maintain
management in control is improper."); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co.,
43 Del. Ch. 353, 362, 230 A.2d 769, 775 (Del. Ch. 1967) ("I have reached the
conclusion that the primary purpose of the issuance of such shares was to
prevent control [from passing to new handsl."); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch.
494, 504, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964) ("[I]f the board has acted solely or
primarily because of the desire to perpetuate themselves in office, the use of
corporate funds for such purposes is improper.").
Many jurisdictions, however, have weakened the business judgment rule
in the context of the closely held corporation. Generally, shareholders in a
close corporation are treated as partners and are therefore obligated by the
fiduciary duties owed by partners. See Comolli v. Comolli, 241 Ga. 471, 246
S.E.2d 278 (1978); Cressy v. Shannon Corp., 378 N.E.2d 941 (Ind. App. 1978);
Campbell v. Campbell, 198 Kan. 181, 422 P.2d 932 (1967); Cain v. Cain, 3
Mass. App. Ct. 467, 334 N.E.2d 650 (1975). In California, for example, the
principle of fiduciary duty in the context of the close corporation has been
extended to a point where majority shareholders must exercise "good faith"
and "inherent fairness" towards the minority. If a corporate action appears
to oppress the rights of minority shareholders, the burden is on the majority
shareholders to show a "compelling business reason" for the activity undertaken. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1969). In Massachusetts the standard is even stricter, including a
duty of "utmost good faith and loyalty" among the shareholders of a close
corporation subject, of course, to an exception for oppressive conduct taken
for a "legitimate business purpose." Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.,
370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367
Mass. 578, 593, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975). While these decisions involve
closely held corporations, it seems logical that in some instances a similar
result would be desirable in publicly held companies. For arguments in favor
of extending this result to publicly held companies, see notes 64-67 and
accompanying text infra.
28. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
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directors had breached their fiduciary duties by engaging in practices designed to thwart a tender offer made by Carter Hawley Hale
Stores.29 The district court granted Field's motion for a directed
verdict 80 and held that there was neither a violation of federal
securities law nor a breach of any fiduciary duty on the part of
2
Field's directors.3 1 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The plaintiffs in Panter challenged four specific actions taken
by the board of directors as being breaches of the board's fiduciary
duties to the shareholders. First, the shareholder plaintiffs contended that the board had adopted a "secret policy" to resist acquisition regardless of any benefits which would accrue to the
corporation or its shareholders.3 3 Second, the shareholders alleged
that the directors had breached their duty by failing to disclose this
policy. 34 The third and fourth grounds for asserting that the
directors had breached their fiduciary duty were that the directors
had made "defensive acquisitions" 3 and filed an antitrust suit
against Carter Hawley for the sole purpose of discouraging Carter
Hawley's tender offer.3 6
Initially, the Seventh Circuit turned to an analysis of the business judgment rule,3 7 rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the
29. 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1173 (N.D. Ill. 1980), a/'d, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). The plaintiffs also alleged violations of
federal securities laws, but since these allegations do not involve the business
judgment rule, a discussion of them has been omitted.
30. Id. at 1195.
31. Id.
32. 646 F.2d at 299.
33. Id. at 293.
34. Id. During the eight years prior to the Carter Hawley offer, the management of Field had rejected at least four separate takeover offers. Id. at
278. The existence of those offers was never disclosed to Field's shareholders.
Id. at 296.
35. Id. at 293. Subsequent to the initiation of the tender offer, Field's
directors entered into negotiations to buy the Liberty House chain of department stores. This chain operated in the Pacific Northwest, an area where
Carter Hawley was already well entrenched. Additionally, Field negotiated
for space in Houston's Galleria Shopping Center, intending to build a store
practically next door to Carter Hawley's Neiman-Marcus store in the same
center. Id. at 280-81.
36. Id. at 293. The directors of Field authorized the filing of an antitrust
suit against Carter Hawley after being informed by counsel that a combination
of Field and Carter would be illegal in light of the existing competition between the two company's stores and the competition between the two which
would develop as a result of Field's defensive acquisitions. 486 F. Supp. at
1188-89.
37. 646 F.2d at 293. The Seventh Circuit essentially adopted the lower
court's interpretation of the business judgment rule. Id. According to the

lower court, the business judgment rule provides that:
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defendant directors should have the burden of establishing a compelling business purpose for their actions.38 The court of appeals
then affirmed the district court on all counts, finding that the
plaintiffs, with whom the burden of proof rested, had failed to
present any evidence of self-dealing, fraud, overreaching, or other
bad conduct sufficient to give rise to any reasonable inference that
impermissible motives predominated in the board's consideration
of the situation.3 9 Furthermore, the court accepted the defendants'
assertion that the desire to expand was a reasonable and natural
action on the part of Field's directors and called the plaintiffs'
accusations mere "Monday-morning-quarterbacking." 40 The court
also stated that even if the desire to "fend-off" the tender offer was
"among the motives" of the board, the plaintiffs had failed to show
that motive to be the sole or primary purpose of the board's actions
and as such judicial scrutiny of the decision was precluded by the
business judgment rule. 41 Accordingly, the rationale of the Panter
court implies that even actions taken with improper motives will
be permitted if any valid business purpose can be attributed to
those acts.
By allowing corporate directors to freely invoke the business
judgment rule as a defense to any shareholder complaint challenging directors' actions, even those actions with only minimal business
purposes, the Panter court has done corporate shareholders an injustice. 42 While it is true that the officers and directors of a corporation are in a unique position of "expertise" and "knowledge" in
corporate matters, the question remains whether a tender offer is a
corporate matter or a personal matter to be decided by the share[d]irectors of corporations discharge their fiduciary duties when in
good faith they exercise business judgment in making decisions regarding the corporation. When they act in good faith, they enjoy a presumption of sound business judlgment, reposed in them as directors,
which courts will not disturb if any rational business purpose can be
attributed to their decisions. In the absence of fraud, bad faith, gross
overreaching or abuse of discretion, courts will not interfere with the
exercise of business judgment by corporate directors.
486 F. Supp. at 1194 (citations omitted).
38. 646 F.2d at 295.
39. Id. at 295-98.
40. Id. at 297.
41. Id.

42. For discussions concerning the inapplicability of the business judgment

rule in the takeover situation, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics & Shareholders' Welfare, supra note 18, at 1745-47; Eastcrbrook
& Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, supra note 18, at 1194-99; Gilson, supra note 18, at 822-24.
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holder.43 This point was raised in the well-reasoned dissent in
Panter. While the dissent agreed with many of the majority's views
concerning the alleged violations of the securities laws,4 4 the dissent
rather vehemently disagreed with the majority concerning the plaintiff's fiduciary duty claims. 45
In dissent, Judge Cudahy emphasized that directors of a corporation have but two functions: first, they must manage the business
enterprise, and second, they must act as a "vehicle" for collecting
and using capital and for distributing profits. The former function
involves the corporate decision-making process; the latter involves
only the corporation-shareholder relationship. 46 Therefore, when
an activity involves only the latter function, fiduciary duties should
be recognized, applied to any and all actions taken by management,
and be subject to judicial review unrestrained by the business judgment rule. 41 As to the required level of director self-interest necessary to shift the burden of proof to the director defendants, Judge
Cudahy stated that "[u]nder the business judgement rule, once a
plaintiff demonstrates that a director had an interest in the transaction at issue, the burden of proof shifts to the director to prove
that the transaction was fair and reasonable to the corporation." 4,
He stressed that the business judgement rule should not clothe
directors with an "almost irrebuttable presumption of sound business judgment, prevailing over everything but the elusive hobgoblins of fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion." 49 Such an
43. See Gilson, supra note 18, at 845-48; Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 12,
at 910-13.
44. 646 F.2d at 299 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The dissenting judge generally agreed with the majority's view of the alleged
securities law violations, but he disagreed with the majority's holding that the
withdrawal of the tender offer prior to the tender of any shares rendered the
Williams Act inapplicable. Id.
45. Id. Judge Cudahy expressed the concern that the majority's holding
removed "whatever constraints still remain upon the ability of corporate directors to place self-interest before shareholder interests" in tender offer
situations. Id.
46. Id. at 299-300 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Note, Protection for Shareholder Interests in Recapitalizations of
Publicly Held Corporations,58 COLUM. L. REV. 1030, 1066 (1958)).
47. 646 F.2d at 299-300 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). In addition, the dissent in Panter recognized that whenever a plaintiff
in a takeover situation demonstrates that a director has an interest in the
transaction, the burden of proof should shift to the director to prove that the
transaction was fair and reasonable. Id. at 301 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382
(2d Cir. 1980)).
48. 646 F.2d at 301 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. Id. at 299 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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approach, he argued, would "virtually immunize" a target company's directors from liability to shareholders in a takeover situation.5o Finally, the dissent noted that even if the predominant
motive standard of Trueblood was the correct standard, it should
be up to the jury to decide whether the directors' improper motives
were indeed the sole purpose behind the directors' actions. It is
not a question of law to be decided by the court.5 1
If it is generally accepted that directors of a corporation stand
in a fiduciary relationship to their corporation 12 and its shareholders,5 and are bound by the principles of fairness, morality, and
honesty, 54 then any breach of these principles is sufficient to sustain
an action against the violator. When shareholders elect directors
to manage the enterprise, these principles are well understood.
The directors are to manage the company with the corporation's
welfare and the shareholder's welfare in mind.
So long as the shareholder is content with his dividends and
stock price, the director's role is merely to make informed business
decisions that will permit the company to prosper, 5 and the business judgment rule will properly apply to those decisions involving
the ordinary affairs of the corporation and transactions between it
and third parties. 56

In the tender offer situation, however, an offer

to contract is really being made to the target company's shareholders, thus making the tender offer situation clearly distinguish50. Id.
51. 646 F.2d at 304-05 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
52. See, e.g., Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis. 2d 222, 201 N.W.2d 593 (1972). See
also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251
(Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d
779 (Del. 1981); Selheimer v. Manganese Corp., 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634
(1966).
53. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919). See also Maldonado
v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, Zapata Corp.
v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Selheimer v. Manganese Corp., 423
Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966); Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis. 2d 222, 201 N.W.2d
593 (1972).
54. Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148
(1919). See also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Maldonado v. Flynn,
413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Selheimer v. Manganese Corp., 423 Pa. 563,
224 A.2d 634 (1966).
55. Of course, if the directorial decisions become detrimental to the company and thus, indirectly detrimental to the shareholders' stock price, directors
may be removed by a proper shareholder vote. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 141(k) (1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1405(a) (Purdon Supp. 1982); TEx.
Bus. CoxP. ACT ANN. art. 2.32 (Vernon 1980).
56. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 21.
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able from contract negotiations between the corporation and unrelated third parties. In the latter situation the business judgment
of the directors should prevail since they have been elected to manage the affairs of the corporation, but in the former situation they
should have little direct involvement since a tender offer involves
only the affairs of the shareholders.5 7 The shareholders did not
consult management when buying their shares, nor did management
intervene in the purchase. Why, then, should corporate management become directly (and expensively) involved in a potential
transfer of shares between a buyer and seller? While it is true that
dicta in Northwest Industries, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich

Co. 58

suggests

that management should actively resist any takeover attempt that
may be detrimental to the corporation and its shareholders, 59 recent
changes in Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 60

(Williams Act) should provide management a sufficient forum for
disclosing the possible detrimental effects to shareholders without
direct interference in the tender offer process. These changes, as

implemented by rule 14e-2,61 require an affirmative disclosure by
57. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, supra note 18. Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel argue that since resistance to tender offers by target
management ultimately decreases shareholder welfare, target directors should
be effectively precluded from intervening. While their article is premised
largely on economic factors (the cost of lawsuits, defensive acquisitions, and
hiring of "expert appraisers"), their approach gives an inordinate amount of
weight to such considerations. It would be simpler to preclude extensive
management activity in the tender offer area merely because the offer to purchase securities has not been made to management, but to the shareholders.
58. 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ii. 1969).
59. Id. at 712. This dicta has been subsequently cited with approval.
See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d at 288; Treadway Cos. v.
Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157,
1161 (lst Cir. 1977). Some commentators assert that director's resistance to
tender offers may result in higher tender premiums. See Herzel, Schmidt &
Davis, supra note 3. While this possibility exists, the problem, however, remains that such actions may well succeed in having the offeror terminate the
offer entirely. See notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). For the text of § 14(e), see note 75 infra.
Senator Harrison Williams, in presenting his Act to Congress, pointed out that
the public shareholder possesses limited knowledge when a tender offer commences, because he is not adequately protected by the disclosure requirements
of the securities acts. See 113 CONG. REc. 24,664 (1967) (statement of Sen.
Williams). The legislation, however, still permitted target companies to remain
silent when a tender offer was proposed. Rule 14e-2 was proposed in order to
alleviate this shortcoming.
61. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1981). This rule provides:
(a) Position of Subject Company. As a means reasonably designed to
prevent fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices within
the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act, the subject company, not
later than 10 business days from the date the tender offer is first
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the target company of its position, if any, with respect to the tender
offer. This statement must be made to its shareholders within ten
days of the publication of a tender offer. It is at this point that
management has the opportunity to raise its objections and propose
its recommendations to the shareholders. These objections and
recommendations could range from generalized factual matters that
management feels warrant rejection of the offer, to detailed discussions of potential antitrust or securities violations, the inadequacy
of the offer, or management's long range plans that may make the
offer less attractive. The forum provided by rule 14e-2 reaches all
shareholders of record and effectively informs them of management's position. 2 Once management makes its objections and
recommendations known, it should then remove itself from the
tender offer process. 63
If, rather than simply informing shareholders of their position,
corporate directors choose to intervene in the offer due to their
published or sent or given, shall publish, send or give to security
holders a statement disclosing that the subject company:
(1) Recommends acceptance or rejection of the bidder's tender
offer;
(2) Expresses no opinion and is remaining neutral toward the
bidder's tender offer; or
(3) Is unable to take a position with respect to the bidder's tender
offer. Such statement shall also include the reason(s) for the position
(including the inability to take a position) disclosed therein.
(b) Material Change. If any material change occurs in the disclosure
required by paragraph (a) of this section, the subject company shall
promptly publish or send or give a statement disclosing such material
change to security holders.
Id.
62. An example of the proper use of rule 14e-2 occurred recently when
Occidental Petroleum Corporation offered $50 per share for 49% of the outstanding stock of Cities Service Company. The Cities Service board of directors
sent a letter to shareholders describing the Occidental offer as "inadequate,"
informing shareholders that the board was actively seeking more favorable
offers, and advising them to "make his or her own decision" regarding the
tender of shares. Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 1982, at 3, col. 1 (s.w. ed.). Shortly
thereafter, Occidental raised its overall offer to $53 per share, and its offer for
45% of the shares to $55. Occidental also improved the terms of a proposed
"second step" merger, which would have affected the holders of untendered
shares. Wall. St. J., Aug. 26, 1982, at 3, col. 1 (s.w. ed.).
63. See Gilson, supra note 18, at 895-98. It is not suggested that rule
14e-2 preempts the business judgment rule in tender offers. Rather, because
the tender offer is made to shareholders and not management, there is no true
"business decision" to be made, even though the target's management is required to make some form of "recommendation" to shareholders. The required
statement should be more an analysis of the facts than a mere opinion, because
a mere opinion might lead to liability for misrepresentation of material facts.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (Supp. IV 1980). For the text of this section, see note
75 infra.
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fiduciary obligation to the company, 4 they risk initiating a delay
that may result in the withdrawal of the offer itself.6 5 Such a result
would obviously be adverse to shareholder welfare since the shareholders would never have an opportunity to accept an offer which,
in essence, had been made directly to them.66 Consequently, if
management is responsible for frivolous litigation or other actions
that result in withdrawal of the offer,6 7 it should be open to shareholder suit. More importantly, the shareholders should be entitled
to a jury's determination of the propriety of the directors' actions
free of the presumptions created by the business judgment rule.
III. ONE

COURT'S APPROACH: MOBIL CORP. V. MARATHON OIL

When Mobil Oil Corporation publicly announced its intention
to make a cash tender offer for control of Marathon Oil, Marathon's directors quickly decided that Mobil's offer was inadequate
68
and not in the best interests of Marathon Oil or its shareholders.
Marathon promptly filed suit to enjoin the proposed merger, claiming a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 69 and began a search
70
for a friendly suitor.
64. As previously noted, several courts have recognized a duty on the part
of directors to oppose takeovers which they have determined are not in the
corporation's best interests. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
65. See generally Jaqua, Defenses Against Uninvited Tender and Exchange
Offers, 59 ILL. B.J. 106 (1970); Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent
Managements in Contesting Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1104 (1969).
66. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
67. For example, management will often raise antitrust claims whether or
not the circumstances warrant it. One prominent attorney has observed that
counsel's view on antitrust is often, "I'll argue the antitrust defense today and
I'll worry about the complications tomorrow. I need every argument I can
get." See Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAW.
1433, 1439 (1977).
68. See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 367 (6th Cir.
1981). See also Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1304-05 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
In fact, as early as five months before Mobil announced its offer to purchase
40 million shares of Marathon stock, Marathon's management had decided to
resist a hostile takeover. Id. at 1305.
69. See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 367 (6th Cir.
1981). The Clayton Act provides in relevant part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital . . .
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (Supp. IV 1980).
70. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 367 (6th Cir. 1981).
One tactic often used by incumbent managements to forestall takeovers is the
solicitation of alternative bids from a "white knight." If a company is an
attractive acquisition, multiple bidders are often located, after which a "bidding
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Marathon's search for a "white knight" was successful, and in
mid-November, 1981, United States Steel Corporation agreed to
offer $125 per share for 51% of Marathon's outstanding common
stock.7 1 This offer, however, was conditioned on the issuance of
two options by Marathon: the first, a nonrevocable option that
allows U.S. Steel to purchase ten million authorized but unissued
shares of Marathon's common stock for $90 per share,m and the
second, an option which would allow U.S. Steel to purchase Marathon's interest in the West Texas Yates Oil Field for $2.8 billion,
exercisable only if Marathon was later acquired by a third party
73
(such as Mobil).

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 74 held that the two options granted to U.S. Steel constituted "manipulative acts" within the meaning of the Williams
Act ,s because the options, both individually and in combination,
war" might ensue, thus raising the price of the takeover. If management is
successful in finding such a bidder, the shareholders may well reap higher
values for their shares. If, however, management cannot find a suitor and
succeeds in delaying the tender, the original offeror might well withdraw, thus
resulting in a perceived economic loss for all shareholders. See E. ARANOW,
H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 201 (1977); Brown, supra note 13, at 875; Gilson, The Case Against
Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept,
34 STAN. L. REV. 775 (1982); Steinbrink, supra note 3, at 893; Ingrassia,
Employees at Acquired Firms Find White Knights Often Unfriendly, Wall St.
J., July 7, 1982, at 23, col. 3; The (Happily) Reluctant Brides, supra note 16,
at 126.
71. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 367 (6th Cir. 1981).
72. Id. In a tender offer situation, the purpose of issuing a share purchase
option to a "white knight" is to make the transaction more expensive to the
hostile offeror. In this instance, assuming that U.S. Steel had exercised its
option and the original Mobil offer had been raised to $125 per share, the
total cost to Mobil or any other bidder would be 1.1 to 1.2 billion dollars
in addition to its original offer. Id. at 375.
73. Id. at 367. The issuance of an option which allows a "white knight"
to buy attractive assets is an effective way to ward off an unwanted tender.
Arguably, if a company is worth $85 per share to an acquirer with its attractive
assets, it should be worth less without such assets. In this instance, Marathon's
disposal of the Yates Field would make it much less attractive to another oil
company (but would also remove any valid antitrust arguments). See generally
Wall St. J., May 15, 1980, at 12, col. 1 (s.w. ed.); Barron's, April 28, 1980,
at 33, col. 2.
74. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
75. Id. at 377. Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended by the Williams Act, provides that "[I]t shall be unlawful for any
person to . . . engage in any fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or
practices in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for
tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of
any such offer, request, or invitation." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). The Supreme
Court has defined the term "manipulative acts" as referring "generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices that are intended to
mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity." Santa Fe Indus. v.
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had the effect of "circumventing the natural forces of market demand" in this tender offer contest.70 The court, however, expressly
stated that the decision in this case did not extend to all forms of
options which might be created to lock-up takeover battles or other77
wise discourage competing tender offers.
While there are several difficulties inherent in the Sixth
Circuit's opinion in Mobil,7 8 the importance of the decision lies in
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977). Manipulative acts connote "intentional or
Willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or
artificially affecting the price of securities." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 199 (1976). See also E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra
note 70, at 144, 275.
76. 669 F.2d at 376. In the course of its opinion, the Sixth Circuit accepted the Supreme Court's definition of "manipulation" as an affecting of
the market for, or price of securities by artificial means. Id. at 374 (quoting
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) and Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)). In this instance, the "lock-up" options
granted to U.S. Steel acted to make its offer an artificial ceiling on the takeover
price, because it discouraged competitive bidding for Marathon shares. 669
F.2d at 375.
77. Id. at 377. Presumably, the court would permit "lock-up" options in
a non-hostile tender offer contest, since the possibility of a bidding contest is
remote when both managements agree to the takeover.
78. The primary difficulty with the Sixth Circuit's decision is the application of the business judgment rule to the acts of the target company's directors.
If one reads Panter as giving target company management unbridled discretion
to act in a tender offer situation, .no breach of fiduciary duty will accrue.
Similarly, without an allegation of manipulation or nondisclosure, no federal
cause of action will lie. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479
(1977). Thus, if the granting of an option is perceived by the court to be a
valid business decision, minority shareholders will be denied effective access to
both state and federal courts. By permitting an action under the anti-manipulative section of the Williams Act, the court is recognizing that minority owners
should be able to challenge management's decisions in the takeover process.
This, however, is an entirely new development in takeover law and faces a
difficult future. In fact, the Seventh Circuit recently affirmed a district court's
decision that Mobil was not applicable where a target company entered into a
binding agreement to sell its major asset in order to frustrate a potential takeover. Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, - F.2d
- (7th Cir. 1982). The district court concluded that the net economic effect
of the asset sale was not a "lock-up" of the target in favor of one of two
bidders. Id. at 949.
Similarly, a federal district court in New York refused to accept the reasoning of the Mobil decision, stating that the rule of law in the Second Circuit
could not bar management from combatting a takeover attempt that it believes
in good faith to be harmful to its shareholders. Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn,
537 F. Supp. 413, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The court went on to say, however,
that the rule would be otherwise on a showing that management was acting
for "its own interests in violation of its fiduciary duty to its shareholders."
Id. (emphasis added). Presumably, had the Icahn group been successful in
proving self-interest as a motive for delay on the part of the target management, a federal action would have been allowed to proceed under the manipulative theory of Mobil.
In both Mobil and Whittaker it might be argued that the sale of assets
constituted a violation of state corporate law because such transactions were
consummated without an affirmative vote of the target company's shareholders.
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its recognition of the unfair nature of lock-up options in the hostile
tender offer situation.79 In such instances, corporate management
occasionally oversteps the boundaries of fair play in its attempts to
fend off the initial thrust of a hostile offeror. When this occurs,
Mobil, by analogy, suggests that shareholders should be afforded an
opportunity to voice their displeasure in an action based on the
anti-manipulative provisions of the Williams Act. In such actions,
the test should be whether the lock-up option effectively deters
competing offers, thereby depriving shareholders, the parties to
whom a tender offer is addressed, of their decision-making rights.80
If courts limit permissible director action once a tender is announced to the making of recommendations to shareholders, 8 ' then
any additional actions taken by the board, including the grant of
lock-up and share purchase options, should be subject to shareholder suit in state court with a judicial scrutiny that is free of the
business judgment rule. 2 In addition, if these actions result in
artificial ceilings on tender prices and inhibit competitive bids, the
target company's board of directors should be held liable for violation of the Williams Act. In both situations, the directors should
be held responsible and accountable to the shareholders for any
economic loss suffered as a result of their actions. 83
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (1953); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN.
§ 79 (1971) (Sales of Assets Other Than in Regular Course of Business).

This
argument, however, was not raised in either case.
79. See generally Gilson, supra note 18, at 878-79 (arguing that once management has reason to believe that a tender offer may be made, all action that
could interfere with the offer should be prohibited). But see Black & Smith,
supra note 12; Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, supra note 3.
80. See 669 F.2d at 377. As one commentator has observed, "if management can use defensive tactics to obtain a degree of control over tender offers
similar to that given it over mergers and sales of assets, then the corporate
structure is fundamentally altered in a fashion which allows management effective monopoly power over corporate control." Gilson, supra note 18, at 846.
81. See text accompanying notes 60-67 supra.
82. It seems obvious that a finding of manipulative practices on the part
of target management would result in the finding of a breach of fiduciary duty
in spite of the application of the business judgment rule. Similarly, where
shareholders allege violations of state corporate law, such as failure to obtain
the required shareholder vote in a sale of assets situation, the board's decision
may be ultra vires and the business judgment rule will not apply. See Regenstein v. J. Regenstein Co., 213 Ga. 157, 97 S.E.2d 693 (1957); Lafayette Realty
Corp. v. Moller, 247 Ind. 433, 436-38, 215 N.E.2d 859, 861 (1966).
83. While the exact amount of any economic loss may be difficult to calculate, courts could adopt methods used in similar situations. In statutory mergers, for example, state law generally gives dissenters the right to raise objections to the proposed transaction and provides alternative means of stock
valuation through the statutory appraisal process for the shares owned by the
dissenters. In the Mobil-Marathon transaction, Marathon's internal appraisal
value of the company's shares ranged from $276 to $323 a share, compared to
the $125 "ceiling" placed on the shares through the U.S. Steel "lock-up" option.
See Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1982, at 4, col. 4.
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PRE-TAKEOVER CORPORATE CHANGES: A "PER SE"

BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

While most takeover defenses are initiated by target management after a tender offer has been announced, 4 some incumbent
managers are "gun-jumping" any would-be takeover attempts by
amending their corporate charters, or by initiating similar tactics
designed to discourage potential suitors. The object of these
maneuvers is to deny the successful tender offeror effective control
of the corporation, or to make the cost of the offer so prohibitive
that any potential acquirer will think twice about making a tender

offer. s

Some of these "pre-tender" actions, however, clearly involve

conflicts of interest, oppression of minority shareholders, or "non-

businesslike" judgments, and if not completely prohibited, they
should at least be subject to judicial scrutiny free of the business
judgment rule. 6
The common law doctrine of fiduciary duty, in the corporate
context, dictates that directors and officers owe loyalty and allegiance
to the corporation, and that loyalty must be undivided while at the
same time allegiance must be influenced only by corporate considerations.8 7 One who is in such a fiduciary position cannot
manipulate the affairs of his corporation in disregard of the standards of common decency and honesty. 8 He cannot serve himself

first and the shareholders second.89

The fiduciary cannot use his

84. See Steinbrink, supra note 3, at 903.
85. Some of the more prevalent methods of accomplishing this result include amending the certificate of incorporation to require a supermajority
shareholder vote to approve business reorganizations, staggering the terms of
directors, eliminating the shareholders' right to call special meetings, allowing
the board to create new directorships, prohibiting the removal of directors
except "for cause," requiring a "supermajority" shareholder vote to amend any
of the "revised" charter provisions, creating "golden parachute" separation
agreements, and approving loans to officers and directors at low or no interest.
See generally note 65 supra. The use of defensive charter provisions so upset
the SEC that it considered barring the shares of companies with such provisions
from being traded in the national market system. Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1980,
at 2, col. 3. See also The SEG Redefines Tender Offers, Bus. WFEK, Mar. 17,
1980, at 43.
86. Presently, if lack of business judgment or independence on the part
of the directors can be shown, the business judgment rule will yield provided
the allegations are justified. See generally Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs.
Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); CrouseHinds Co. v. Inter-North, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980).
87. See generally Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 667-68 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
88. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939).
89. See id. The diversion of corporate opportunity doctrine prevents a
director from taking for himself any business opportunity which properly
belongs to the corporation. See generally General Automotive Mfg. Co. v.
Singer, 19 Wis. 2d 528, 120 N.W.2d 659 (1963).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss1/2

18

Johnson: Anti-Takeover Actions and Defenses: Business Judgment or Breach o
1982-83]

ANTI-TAKEOVER ACTIONS AND DEFENSES

power for personal advantage, to the detriment of stockholders and
creditors, no matter how absolute his power is perceived to be and
no matter how meticulous the fiduciary is to satisfy technical requirements. 90 Should a fiduciary violate or attempt to violate these
principles, a court of equity has the power to undo the wrong or
intervene to prevent its consummation. 9x In this respect, however,
it should be noted that while fiduciary duties are elastic and that
the liability of an officer or director varies directly with the culpability of his conduct, some anti-takeover defensive tactics are by
definition attempts to deprive shareholders of potential takeover
profits. 92 As such, these tactics constitute such clear breaches of
fiduciary duty that they should not survive a shareholder action
for breach.
One of the most popular anti-takeover tactics in use today is
the so-called "golden parachute." This device enables directors of
a company to enter into binding contracts to pay severance benefits
to officers and high ranking employees in the event of a takeover,
friendly or otherwise. 93 Often, these severance agreements permit
the officers to resign after a change in control 94 and still retain
benefits.
90. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939).
91. Id.
92. See generally 1 R. MAGNUSON, supra note 19, at § 9.03 (1982). In
application of this elastic fiduciary duty model, it is probable that some pretakeover defensive tactics will be viewed as being more onerous than others.
"Golden parachute" agreements may very well be perceived differently than
those devices which are neutral on their face such as a supennajority vote requirement. In this respect, however, it should be remembered that regardless
of intention, pre-takeover defensive tactics all lead to the same result, namely
a reduction in shareholder welfare.
93. See, e.g., FORBES, Nov. 22, 1982, at 238. A recent study has shown that
golden parachutes have become more common in the past three years. In fact,
"60% of the top executives of America's 1,000 largest firms have such protection." Id. Phillips Petroleum, for example, recently voted to pay its six top
executives all of their salaries and benefits for a period of three years after
any change in "control" of the company. The total cost to Phillips, in the
event of a takeover, would be 9.1 million dollars. Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1982,
at 8, col. I (s.w. ed.); Proxy Statement of Phillips Petroleum, Mar. 1982.
See also David, Thiokol's Davis has a $2.6 million "Parachute," Phila. Bus. J.,
July 26-Aug. 1982, at 1, col. 1; Ingrassia, supra note 70.
94. See David, supra note 93. The answer to the question of what constitutes a "change in control" is not clear. While the normal definition, and
perhaps the intended one, might be acquisition of 51% of the outstanding
stock by an outsider, control in many cases can be obtained with less than a
majority of the shares. See, e.g., Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572
(2d Cir. 1962); In re Caplan's Petition, 20 A.D.2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (App.
Div.), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 708, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (N.Y. 1964);
Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1212 (1958). Thus, if
the "golden parachute" agreement so specifies, even a small percentage of
shares or an investment block of 20% could trigger the payoff provisions. See
generally Meyer, Lawyer's Lament, Arbitrager's Delight, FORBES, May 24, 1982,
at 31.
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While it might be argued that such contracts encourage top
management to remain with the company and eliminate possible
management distraction in the event of a change in control, 95 the
reality of the situation should prove otherwise. Faced with a potential takeover, management of the target company must represent
the interests of the corporation's shareholders and must report their
opinions on the takeover to the shareholders as required under
rule 14e-2. 9 6 The quality of that report might well suffer if management has become complacent due to the severance contract.
Worse yet, any incentives to inform and protect shareholders might
well take second place to the financial windfall which would accrue
to the benefit of the officers and directors. As a matter of common
sense, the potential for officer and director negligence and abuse of
the "undivided loyalty" owed the corporation and its shareholders
is greater when "golden parachutes" are in place.
In addition, since officers and directors must dedicate their
uncorrupted business judgment to the corporation and its shareholders,9 7 and since any potential conflict of interest must be resolved in a manner that is fair and reasonable to the corporation
and its shareholders,98 it is difficult to perceive how there can be
any justification for a multi-million dollar payout to former employees triggered simply by a change in corporate control. Furthermore, if the economics are crucial to the proposed takeover, it
seems logical that an acquiring company might well reduce its
tender offer to shareholders to reflect the drain on the corporate
treasury to be caused by severance agreements. Thus, if Company
X was willing to offer $20 per share for Company Y's shares, it
might offer $18 instead, which would take into account the $2 per
share cost of severance benefits.9 9 Clearly, the "golden parachute"
95. See Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1982, at 8, col. 3.
96. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1981). See notes 59-63 and accompanying text
supra.
97. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
952 (1955). See Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964);
Bennet v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. Ch. 1962); Yasik v.
Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 17 A.2d 309 (Del. Ch. 1941).
98. Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361, 385 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), aff'd, 436 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1971). When
a conflict of interest exists the business judgment rule does not apply and
courts will examine the transaction for substantive fairness. See Remillard
Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952);
Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. Ch. 1976).
99. The total cost of severance benefits are by no means a trifling sum.
Such payments would total $9.1 million in the case of Phillips Petroleum.
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agreement is prejudicial to corporate shareholders, includes selfdealing on the part of corporate directors and officers, and results
in a "raid" of the corporate treasury.0 0 It therefore should be
prohibited as it constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty. 01'
Another common anti-takeover tactic is to adopt a charter
amendment requiring a "supermajority vote" to approve all major
corporate decisions. 10 2 These provisions tie the hands of a potential
tenderor by requiring the approval of as much as ninety-five percent
of the outstanding shares to consummate a takeover. Once such a
provision is adopted, management can effectively grant itself a veto
power over all tender offers if it accumulates only five percent of
See note 93 supra. In the case of Sunbeam Corporation, the total cost was
nearly $I0 million. Wall St. J., July 7, 1982, at 23, col. 3. And in the case
of Gulf Resources and Chemical Corporation the cost approached $13 million.
Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1982, at 18, col. 2 (S.W. ed.). See also David, supra note

93.

100. In some situations only nonemployee directors are permitted to vote
to establish "golden parachute" provisions. Even so, too many variables exist
to permit "outside" directors to exercise this power. For instance, "outside"
directors often owe their positions to "insiders," or the outside directors may
not be able to gather sufficient data on which to base a decision on how much
is "fair value," how much is excess compensation, or the probable effect of
these provisions on stockholder welfare. See generally Galef v. Alexander, 615
F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980); Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or
Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 604-07 (1982); Marsh, Are Directors
Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35 (1966).
101. It should be noted that severance payments, bonus contracts and
similar fringe benefits are common in industry. Therefore, it is not suggested
that these forms of incentives be prohibited in all cases. Only when the
"golden parachute" payments are directly related to a change in corporate
control should they be disallowed. Thus, a prospective employee would still
be free to negotiate an employment contract with the firm. If such severance
payments are desired as part of the contract package, it would normally be
coupled with a covenant not to compete or a consulting arrangement. To
pay enormous salaries for nothing more than resigning, however, may well be
grounds for director negligence and unbusinesslike judgment. See generally
2 R. MAGNUSEN, supra note 19, at § 15.05.
102. Usually these provisions apply only to votes on major corporate decisions such as mergers and sales of assets and are usually conditioned on factors
such as lack of director approval of the transaction. In this way the supermajority provision does not unduly hamper the current management. The
required "supermajority" can range from 3 to as high as 95%. The charter
or by-law amendment creating the supermajority vote requirement is usually
coupled with an amendment requiring a similar supermajority vote for any
future amendment of the charter or by-laws. In this way a successful acquirer
is precluded from using a simple majority to adopt an amendment eliminating
the supermajority provision. See Sellers v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 23
Del. Ch. 13, 2 A.2d 108 (Del. Ch. 1938). See generally Black & Smith, supra
note 12; Smith, Fair Price and Redemption Rights: New Dimensions in Defense
Charter Provisions, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1978); Contra Young v. Valhi, 382
A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978); E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra
note 70, at 195; Gilson, supra note 18; Gilson, supra note 70; Mullaney,
Guarding Against Takeovers-Defensive Charter Provisions, 25 Bus. LAW. 1441
(1970).
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the outstanding stock or places five percent of the stock in "friendly"
hands. Such a concentration of power is alarming, especially in
the context of a publicly held corporation.
While most corporate statutes specifically permit supermajority
voting requirements, 10 8 most courts have lost sight of the fact that
high voting majorities were originally of interest only to small
closely-held corporations. 10 4 When adopted by a close corporation,
supermajority voting requirements serve to prevent oppression or
squeeze-out of the minority.'0 In the context of the publicly held
corporation, however, the supermajority vote provision usually
facilitates these evils since the very purpose for its adoption is to
give incumbent corporate management control over future tender
offers. Thus, the supermajority vote tends to create an oppressive
atmosphere because future generations of shareholders will be unable to replace officers and directors, or to accept a tender, without
the required percentage of votes, even though a clear majority of
shares would vote in favor of the change or the tender.
Not only are supermajority voting provisions oppressive when
adopted in the context of a publicly held corporation, but these
provisions also involve a degree of self-dealing on the part of management. 106 Since a takeover by a tender offer would normally lead
CODE §§ 602(a), 603(a), 1201(a) (West. Supp. 1981);
§ 102(b)(4) (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 616(a)(2)
(McKinney 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1805 (Purdon 1967); Model Business

103. See CAL. CORP.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,

Corp. Act. Ann. § 143 (Supp. 1971).
104. See E. FOLK, THE NEW DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW 8 (1967). An
excellent discussion of this point can be found in Gilson, supra note 70. Professor Gilson points out that "[w]hile these statutory provisions are not on
their face limited to close corporations, the legislative history is quite clear in
pointing to the relationship between the needs of the close corporation and
statutory authorization of supermajority voting requirements."
Id. at 813.
But see Smith, supra note 102, at 10 (no sound public policy against the supermajority voting requirement has been voiced); E. FOLK, TuE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATE LAW 13 (1972).
105. See generally W. PAINTER, CORPORATE AND TAX ASPEcTs OF CLOSELYHELD CORPORATIONS 163, 201 (1981). But see Smith, supra note 102, at 13

(describing how a supermajority vote provision may be used in a public issue
corporation to protect the minority where the tender offeror attempts to freeze
out the remaining minority subsequent to a successful tender).
106. See, e.g., W. CARY &M . EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COR-

461 (5th ed. 1980) (observing that "[allthough often cast in the
guise of protecting shareholders against 'raiders' or conflict of interest transactions, in fact they are normally adopted for the sole purpose of insuring
that incumbent management will not lose their positions as a result of the
take-over bid."). Even the proxy statements distributed to shareholders in
connection with the adoption of supermajority vote provisions point out that
the provision will tend to perpetuate the incumbent board and management,
and will tend to discourage some tender offers. See Proxy Statement of
Landmark Banks, Inc., April, 1982. See also Buford, Amending the Corporate
Charter, 32 Bus. LAW. 1353, 1355 (1977); Cary, Corporate Devices Used To
Insulate Management From Attack, 25 Bus. LAW. 839 (1970).
PORATIONS
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to a change in control by the new shareholders, provisions perpetuating the control of incumbent management are clearly at odds
with shareholder interests. Moreover, since tender offers are actually
offers made directly to shareholders,10 7 any attempt to enhance
management's power to deny shareholders the ability to accept such
an offer should be struck down as a breach of management's
fiduciary duty.
Finally, in light of the holding in Mobil Oil that certain defensive tactics employed by Marathon Oil resulted in a "circumvention of the natural forces of market demand," 108 it could be
argued that as pre-tender charter amendments tend to perpetuate
incumbent management and reduce shareholder welfare, they also
tend to circumvent normal market demand and act as a restraint
on the normal trading of securities. As such, those devices, at least
where they are sufficiently connected with a tender offer, should
give rise to a federal cause of action for violation of the Williams
Act 109 in addition to the state cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty.
While similar arguments could be raised against the remaining
catalogue of pre-tender defensive tactics, 110 it seems unnecessary to
belabor the point. Common sense dictates that pre-tender offer
amendments which enhance management power and control at the
expense of shareholder welfare should be prohibited in publicly
held companies. The market place should dictate management's
future, not deliberately conceived plans to further management's
economic and personal well-being."' It remains, however, for
107. See notes 57-60 and accompanying text supra; Gilson, supra note 70,
at 776.
108. 669 F.2d at 376.
109. See notes 75-80 and accompanying text supra. For the text of § 14(e)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see note 75 supra.
110. For example, low or no interest term loans structured to provide for
forgiveness if management is replaced or control is changed obviously benefit
the recipients and harm shareholders. Eliminating the right of shareholders to
call "special meetings" enhances management's control at the expense of shareholder power. Finally, while staggering the terms of the directors may provide
continuity of management, it also promotes directorial control and inhibits
shareholder welfare through its deterrent effect on tenders and the inability
of minority groups to place a director on the board. For a description of
other pre-tender defensive tactics, see Gilson, supra note 70, at 775; Reuben &=
Elden, How To Be A Target Company, 23 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 423 (1978).

111. Clearly, if management is successful at its job, the stock price will
remain high and that in itself should deter most tender offers.

Additionally,

if an offeror pays a high price, he is often buying management as well as plant,
because he is impressed with the target's performance. For example, when
Britain's Imperial Group tendered for the Howard Johnson Company, management was offered continued employment by the acquirer. Faces Behind The
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courts and legislatures to recognize this principle and bring reality
into the tender offer arena.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to show that a breach of management's fiduciary duty, through self-dealing, conflicts of interest, or
negligence, is present in tender offer responses and in pre-tender
offer defensive tactics. Through the use of such methods as supermajority voting requirements and golden parachutes, incumbent
corporate managements have attempted to thwart hostile takeovers
even before they have begun. Nonetheless, by application of the
business judgment rule, courts have traditionally upheld managements' actions in resisting hostile offers regardless of the effect on
shareholder rights and welfare. A more balanced approach is necessary. Both courts and legislatures should recognize the proprietary
needs of the shareholders when a tender offer occurs. Management
should be precluded from involving itself directly in a tender offer
and any involvement that does occur should be subject to judicial
scrutiny without the protection of the business judgment rule.
Furthermore, management should be uniformly precluded from
advocating corporate charter amendments that are designed to enhance its power, position, and prestige to the detriment of shareholder well-being. The marketplace should be the primary factor
influencing the making of a tender offer and shareholders should
have the opportunity to accept or reject an offer based on these
conditions free from any takeover barriers raised by management.
Figures: Too Good To Resist, FoRBEs, Oct. 15, 1979, at 194. It is only when
management isn't performing well that its employment is in jeopardy.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss1/2

24

